The fairest conclusion, it seems, is that there is little correlation between "supporting" the President on Court reduction and general support for him in opposition to congressional policies. More specifically, perhaps, such evidence indicates little reason to cast this issue into a simple "pro" and "anti" Johnson dichotomy.
The evidence of Johnson's attitude toward the bill must weaken the notion that it was primarily directed against him. The bill was signed and enrolled by both houses on July 19, 1866. Johnson approved the bill four days later. Approval of the bill could not have been a mere case of Johnson bowing to the inevitable will of Congress because such was not his nature. Moreover, had he really opposed the bill, he could have resorted to the simple expedient of a pocket veto, for Congress adjourned on July 28.
In the light of Johnson's lifetime attitude toward the judiciary, his action, or inaction, in 1866 is not surprising. As a young con- There is some supporting evidence for Representative Wilson's contention that the justices had no objection to a reduction in the Court's membership. Chief Justice Chase, in fact, had prepared a proposal based on the same quantitative decrease. The Chief Justice was no stranger to the notion of reduction. As a senator in 1855 he had proposed that the Court be decreased to six members. At that time the Senate considered a bill to relieve the Supreme Court justices of circuit duties. Chase personally favored the idea but argued there no longer would be a need for a larger court in Washington. He reminded his colleagues correctly in 1855 that the Court had been increased to nine members in 1837 so as to apportion more equitably the onerous burdens of circuit travels. Although Chase's plan failed in 1855, he managed to attract an interesting variety of supporters. Northern and Southern Democrats and Whigs and the Free Soilers either voted for Chase's amendment or declared their support in principle. While Chase, and those who spoke in behalf of his motion, talked about a lessened need for nine justices, there was a less apparent, but more subtle and significant, motivating factor. The Su- Trumbull reintroduced the bill in the first days of the next Congress, and once again there was no difficulty on the Supreme Court increase provision. Many Senators recognized the need to raise the Court to an odd number. In 1869 there were eight men on the bench; judicial defiance of the mortality tables prevented fulfillment of the 1866 desire for the more decisive number of seven. As before, the circuit judgeships provoked opposition. Some Republicans and Democrats renewed their efforts to secure a greatly enlarged Supreme Court, dividing itself for duties in Washington and in the circuits. A few Republicans, led by Roscoe Conkling, opposed the bill as utterly inadequate and preferred a more complete and autonomous circuit-court system. There also 
